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privatization reform implemented by the “Chicago Boys” during the
Pinochet regime facilitated the creation of new groups and hence
the renovation of the country’s elites. Using new data we find that
firms sold during this privatization later became part of new business
groups, process aided by an economic crisis that debilitated traditional
elites. Moreover, some firms were bought by Pinochet’s allies and
were later used as providers of capital within groups. We conclude
that privatizations can empower outsiders to replace business elites.
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1 Introduction
Business groups are the predominant organizational structure in modern Chile (Rojas, 2015).1
Yet an empirical examination of how these groups became one of the most important actors in
the country’s economy has been notably absent. This article tests the long-standing hypothesis
that the privatization reform implemented by the “Chicago Boys” during the Pinochet regime
(1973-1990) facilitated the creation of business groups and hence the renovation of economic
elites. The idea that government policies might contribute to the formation of business groups
has been suggested by academics in Chile (e.g. Lefort 2010) and elsewhere (e.g. Morck and
Nakamura 2007; Kandel et al. 2019). Using newly collected firm-level data we find that firms
sold during this privatization reform later became part of new business groups, a process seem-
ingly aided by an economic crisis that debilitated traditional business elites.
The privatization process in Chile was implemented in the 1970s and 1980s by a group of
economists known as the “Chicago Boys.” These economists worked as advisors of dictator
Augusto Pinochet and argued that by selling state-owned firms the economy would be more
productive. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically document a
relationship between this privatization and current business groups. In Khanna and Yafeh (2007)
the authors also point out that government policies – such as a privatization reform – might
explain the origins of groups in China, Japan, Malaysia, and Russia, among others. Relatedly
Morck and Nakamura (2007) argue that privatization reforms can be historical circumstances
that facilitate a “big push” coordinated by the private sector through business groups. However,
most of this work consist of case studies and systematic evidence is lacking. Our primary
contribution is to formally test if privatizations lead to the formation of business groups. In
doing so, we highlight how government policies coupled with historical circumstances such as
an economic crisis can contribute to the renovation of business elites.
The context of our study is the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), after Salvador Allende
(1970-1973) nationalized a large number of firms. At the time Chile was a developing country
in the civil law tradition where business groups were young and steady: in 1970 little more than
20% of publicly traded firms were affiliated to a business group (Salvaj and Couyoumdjian,
2016), a number which was essentially the same in 1960. In 1990, however, group affiliation
1A business group is defined as firms with a common controlling shareholder and they are prevalent across
the world, affecting firm performance, internal capital markets, and contributing to the formation of corporate
empires. Examples of papers studying the effects of business groups include Khanna and Palepu (2000); Johnson
et al. (2000); Bertrand et al. (2002); Morck et al. (2005); Almeida et al. (2011), among many others.
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jumped to 70% of publicly traded firms. Our analysis reveals that Pinochet’s privatizations
contributed to this rise. We show that new business groups were built around privatized firms,
and particularly so when firms were sold after the 1982-1983 economic crisis, a period where
traditional elites were financially debilitated. Moreover, some firms were bought by Pinochet’s
allies, who placed them at the bottom of pyramids and used them as providers of capital within
groups. We conclude that privatizations can empower outsiders to replace business elites.
The empirical analysis uses new data for 79 listed firms observed over five decades (1960-
2005). We digitized this information from the archives of the regulatory agency in charge of
collecting annual reports with firms’ activities. Besides balance sheets, income statements, and
other information, we also uncovered business groups at different points in time. Additionally,
we identified 50 firms that were privatized during the 1970s and 1980s, together with infor-
mation about their buyers. Privatization reforms are often plagued by poor implementation
(Fisman and Wang, 2014) and Chile is not different (González et al., 2020). To account for
the implementation of this policy we classified firms into those sold to buyers that worked for
Pinochet and other “politically unconnected” buyers. Our econometric strategy compares the
evolution of business ownership between privatized and non-privatized firms within the same
industry. The comparison group is composed by firms which operated during the same period
of time but remained private throughout the period. These 29 control firms were also large
companies which could have been privatized if Salvador Allende would have stayed in power.
We take insights from the historical context to offer a framework that guides our empirical
analysis. There are traditional and new business agents who maximize their wealth and have the
opportunity to buy state-owned firms in the context of a privatization. The government maxi-
mizes revenues and political support. Traditional business agents suffered a wealth shock due to
an economic crisis and new business agents use this opportunity to acquire state-owned firms.
This simple model predicts that firms will become part of new business groups, particularly so
if firms were sold after a crisis. In addition, the model also predicts that business agents who
are close to the government will use these firms as a source of capital. The mechanism is a
substitution away from privileged access to bank loans when the dictatorship ends, as suggested
in previous literature (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; González and Prem, 2020).
Guided by the framework we organized results in two parts. The first part shows that firms
privatized by the Pinochet regime were 32-37 percentage points more likely to become part
of new business groups after the transition to democracy than non-privatized ones in the same
industry. Importantly, group affiliation across privatized and non-privatized firms was similar
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before the Pinochet years, i.e. 1960 and 1970. Moreover, this tendency of privatized firms to
become part of new business groups is larger for the subset of firms that were privatized after the
1982-1983 economic crisis – i.e. 40-43 versus 24-28 percentage points – providing suggestive
evidence for the role played by the crisis in debilitating traditional business elites. This pattern
reverses for traditional groups: firms that were privatized before the crisis were more likely to
become part of old business groups. The former result is somewhat imprecisely estimated given
the small sample, but the latter result is statistically significant and consistent with the negative
impact of the crisis on traditional bank-based business groups (Silva, 1996; Rojas, 2015).
The second part studies the role of firms within groups using four outcomes. We study
pyramids with (i) an indicator for firms that were part of a pyramid and (ii) a variable that
reveals the position of firms within pyramids.2 We also study internal capital markets with
(iii) a variable that detects which firms provided loans to other firms in the group and (iv) a
similar variable for firms receiving loans from the group. In both cases we find evidence that
is consistent with the framework: privatized firms are used as sources of capital, but only when
bought by individuals who presumably lost privileged access to bank loans. In particular, we
show that firms sold to “connected buyers” were twice more likely to be part of a pyramid, were
placed at the bottom of these pyramids, and became providers of credit within the group.
All results are robust to a wide range of empirical exercises. Results are similar when we
use three different matching estimators providing arguably better comparisons than ordinary
least squares (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Crump et al., 2009). Importantly, results are also
similar when we use historical data to control for group affiliation in 1970, when we drop
from the estimating sample the few firms which experienced takeovers, and when we include
additional listed firms to increase the size of the comparison group. Finally, we reach the same
conclusions when we employ a coefficient stability method that adjusts our estimates for the role
of potentially relevant unobservable variables that could be driving the privatization decision
and the outcomes we examine (Altonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2019).
Earlier work studying business groups in Chile has suggested the importance of the Chicago
Boys privatization (Lefort, 2010). Moreover, most academics argue that existing business
groups are young and their origins are probably related to the 1982-1983 economic crisis. For
example, Rojas (2015, p. 62) says that “this second privatization round [after the crisis] brought
2Pyramids allow shareholders to control other firms indirectly (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), their pres-
ence is common outside of the United States (La Porta et al., 1999), and they are associated to the expropriation of
minority shareholders and tunneling (Johnson et al., 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Lin et al., 2011).
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new business groups to the scene. These groups did not involve families; rather, the executives
of privatized firms built them and later expanded their operations to include other domestic
industries and foreign markets.” Our work provides empirical evidence that supports these
hypotheses. In doing so, we also complement earlier work studying the origins of political cor-
porations (González et al., 2020). In contrast to that study, which concentrated on the political
consequences of types of privatization within the set of privatized firms, we focus on privatized
versus non-privatized firms, on the formation of business groups, and the renovation of business
elites. We also use more firm-level data and new business group affiliation data over a 40-year
period (1960-2005). Finally, we speak to a different literature that studies the contribution of
government policies to the evolution of business groups and pyramidal ownership.
Scholars have studied business groups and pyramids since at least the beginning of the
twentieth-century (Berle and Means, 1932). More recent work studies conditions that facilitate
the formation of these organizational structures (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). A key contri-
bution is Kandel et al. (2019), who show the relation between the disappearance of groups in
the U.S., government policies, and anti-big business sentiments. Theoretically a business group
can appear as a consequence of market underdevelopment or market imperfections (Leff, 1978;
Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006), institutional voids (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007), economic cir-
cumstances combined with managerial capabilities (Guillén, 2000), or targeted policies (Morck
and Nakamura, 2007; Schneider, 2010). In addition, pyramids can arise because of advantages
derived from internal capital markets within groups (Bena and Ortiz-Molina, 2013) and portfo-
lio diversification (Manikandan and Ramachandran, 2015).3
We contribute to this literature by studying the origins of business groups after a large pri-
vatization. Our results support descriptive evidence gathered by Khanna and Yafeh (2007) sug-
gesting that government policies are behind the origins of groups in many countries. We also
show that most privatized firms became part of new (instead of traditional) business groups.
Hence, we argue that the privatization reform facilitated the renovation of elites and contributed
to the formation of contemporaneous business groups, similar to processes that unfolded in
Japan, Russia, and South Africa, among others (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).
Finally, we also contribute to the literature that studies the usages and consequences of
privatization reforms. Although the traditional literature focused mostly on changes in produc-
3Case studies analyzing what factors might affect the evolution of groups are more common. Previous research
emphasizes the importance of vertical versus horizontal group growth as a function of firms’ previous profitability
(Almeida et al., 2011) and point to case studies of East asian economies (Carney and Child, 2013), the Koç group
in Turkey (Colpan and Jones, 2015), and British merchants (Jones, 2000), among others.
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tivity after a privatization, recent research emphasizes potential unintended consequences.4 In
a seminal paper, Fisman and Wang (2014) find that privatization had a positive effect on the
performance of Chinese firms, except when privatizations were corrupt. Similarly, Black et al.
(2000) argue that the massive Russian privatization program resulted in widespread expropria-
tion through self-dealing by the new owners. Privatizations might also constitute an opportunity
for business elites to invest in de facto economic power when foreseeing a democratization, thus
helping to create “captured democracies” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Previous research
emphasizes that privatization might be used as a policy to increase political support (Bel, 2010)
or to create political corporations that are instrumental to gain or retain power (González et al.,
2020). We contribute to this literature by showing that privatizations can help elites to persist
over time (1970s privatization) but also to partially renovate them with new business agents
when the reform is coupled with an economic crisis (1980s privatization).
2 Historical background
2.1 Business groups in historical perspective
Few companies operated under the same ownership in the nineteenth century (Kirsch, 1977;
Aguirre, 2017). As argued by Garretón and Cisternas (1970), these were mostly families who
controlled firms in different industries but did not necessarily operated as a coordinated group.
The degree of corporate coordination changed with “modern” business groups in the twenti-
eth century. Rojas (2015) puts it simple: “during the first half of the twentieth century, both
family-owned and foreign companies acted as business groups, using individuals to coordinate
decisions across several companies as a result of their involvement on multiple boards.”5 How-
ever, groups were far from widespread and only in the following decades they would become
powerful. In the 1930s, both external and internal shocks played an important role in the cre-
ation of modern groups. Economically, Chile was one the countries most negatively affected
by the Great Depression in the early 1930s, leading the state to develop an economic policy of
import substitution industrialization (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010).
4Prominent examples in the early literature include Barberis et al. (1996); La Porta and López-de-Silanes
(1999); D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and Frydman et al. (1999), among others. See Megginson and Netter
(2001) and Estrin et al. (2009) for surveys of this literature.
5Examples include the copper broker Gibbs & Co. which held stakes in many companies, and the Croatian
Pascual Barburizza who sat on the boards of 21 companies in 1920.
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The industrialization process that unfolded after the 1929 worldwide crisis began its course
under the government of Arturo Alessandri (1932-1938) and continued under the three consec-
utive governments of the Radical Party (1938-1952). The most important policy of the time
was the creation of the Production Development Corporation in 1939 (Collier and Sater, 2004).
Examples of important companies operating under the umbrella of this entity were the National
Electricity Company, the Pacific Steel Company, the National Oil Company, and the National
Sugar Industry, among others (details in Appendix A). In a matter of years the state became
owner of multiple firms in different sectors and hence one of the most important (state-owned)
“business groups” in the country (Salvaj and Couyoumdjian, 2016). Following the industrial-
ization policy, several studies reported an increasing concern about economic concentration and
technological stagnation arising from the existence of business groups (Lagos, 1962; Zeitlin
et al., 1974). Even the government showed its discontent by submitting a bill to Congress to
amend the country’s corporate law and reduce business groups’ influence (Rojas, 2015, p. 55).
The increasing economic concentration and the rise of the left-wing in the 1960s facilitated
the victory of the socialist coalition known as Popular Unity in 1970 (González, 2013). In
November of that year Salvador Allende was elected president and the economy took an abrupt
turn (Girardi and Bowles, 2018). Allende’s economic plan became known as the Vuskovic plan
– named after the Ministry Pedro Vuskovic – and one of its pillars was the nationalization of
firms.6 The plan was to first buy the largest companies in the country and then take control
of the remaining firms in the economy.7 To facilitate this nationalization program, president
Allende invoked a 1932 law that allowed him to take control of a firm “whenever a strike or
a breakdown would be against the public interest.” As a consequence of this policy, the im-
portance of the public sector rose significantly and the development of modern business groups
formed in previous decades suffered a large shock that contributed to their extinction (Larrain
and Meller, 1991). While in 1965 state companies represented 14% of gross domestic product
(GDP), by 1973 this percentage had almost tripled to 39% of GDP (Hachette, 2000) and the
Production Development Corporation owned more than 500 firms.
The poor economic performance of Salvador Allende’s government was at the root of in-
creasing social tensions that led to a coup d’etat. In 1973 inflation rose to 441% and the fiscal
6Other pillars of the plan were to increase expropriations of agricultural plots in the context of the agrarian
reform, regulate prices in the economy, and increase the wages of workers.
7At the same time, the government aimed at taking control of banks, which allowed them to offer credit to
state-owned firms. Perhaps the most well known case within this program is the 1971 nationalization of copper,
which created a confrontation between Allende and U.S. copper companies.
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deficit of the central government reached 25% of GDP (Lüders, 1993). On September 11, 1973
Allende was removed from power by a military coup led by the Chilean armed forces and the
police. Hundreds of firms that were in the process of nationalization were returned to their
owners and the country experienced another radical turn now towards market-based economic
policies (Huneeus, 2006). The economic process that unfolded in previous decades continued
its course and business groups began to flourish once again (Dahse, 1979).
2.2 Pinochet, privatization, and the Chicago Boys
The dictatorship that followed Allende’s government lasted seventeen years. The leaders of the
armed forces shared power in a military junta until 1974 when Augusto Pinochet, the leader
of the army, took control. One of Pinochet’s most important economic policies was a massive
privatization reform implemented between 1974 and 1989, which aimed to undo Allende’s na-
tionalization program and privatize additional preexisting state-owned firms. Behind the design
of this reform there was a group of economists mostly trained at the University of Chicago,
and thus popularly known as the “Chicago Boys,” who believed in the efficiency of the market
and the role of the private sector.8 Most of these economists were trained under the umbrella
of an alliance between the economics department at the Catholic University of Chile and the
economics department at the University of Chicago (Correa, 1986; Gallardo, 2011).
The objectives of the privatization reform were to reduce the state intervention in the econ-
omy and the fiscal deficit. However, the implementation of this reform was interrupted in 1982
and 1983 as Chile experienced a severe economic crisis with GDP falling 14%, one of the
largest economic downturns since the Great Depression. Panel (a) in Figure 1 plots the time
series of GDP per capita using data from Dı́az et al. (2016). By the end of 1983 the percentage
of GDP represented by state owned firms had fallen to 24%, poverty rates increased from 30 to
55%, inflation doubled, and the unemployment rate rose to 30% of the labor force (Barandiarán
and Hernandéz, 1999; Hachette, 2000). The government responded to the crisis by buying back
several of previously privatized firms. As the downturn faded, a second wave of privatizations
unfolded until the transition to democracy in 1990. Overall, the number of public firms de-
creased from a peak of 596 in 1973 to 45 in 1989 – which represented only 12.5% of GDP
(Hachette, 2000) – and several traditional business groups disappeared.
8How this group of economists reached that level of influence has been an active area of research. Scholars
have emphasized how the right-wing party and their associated technocrats took advantage of the military coup to
advice the armed forces and suggest policies (Spooner, 1999; Huneeus, 2006; Cavallo et al., 2011).
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Although the Pinochet regime understood the privatization process as a “diffusion of prop-
erty to make Chile a country of owners” (Huneeus, 2006, p. 314), the actual implementation of
the reform was far from ideal. According to the most comprehensive report studying these pri-
vatizations, the process was characterized by a lack of information about the sales, a variety of
unpredictable methods used in the transactions, and relatively low sale prices (Congress Report,
2004).9 The 1982-1983 crisis also affected the regime’s sale strategy and the set of potential
buyers of these firms. As we argue below, the existing business elite was shattered, providing
the necessary space for a new business elite to emerge. Lefort (2010, p. 388) puts it succinctly:
“the 1982 debt crisis meant that most bank-based conglomerates became bankrupt. [A]s some
traditional business groups disappeared, others that were financially more robust emerged by
acquiring controlling stakes from the government or the bankrupt groups.” All in all, the rela-
tive importance of external (e.g. crisis) versus internal (e.g. lack of information) factors driving
the quality of the privatization process is a matter of debate. However, recent evidence shows
that as a consequence of the poor implementation there were many individuals who worked for
Pinochet that ended up buying many of these firms (González et al., 2020).
2.3 The transition to democracy
In October of 1988 Augusto Pinochet lost a referendum that intended to extend his presidency
for eight more years. The election took place following the guidelines in the 1980 Constitution
crafted by the same regime and allegedly approved by citizens in a controversial and fraudulent
referendum (Fuentes, 2013). Pinochet’s defeat at the polls in 1988 was unexpected because after
fifteen years without free elections people actually organized to vote against Pinochet – despite
potential fears of repression (Bautista et al., 2020) – and also because he acknowledge his defeat.
Part of this result can be explained by the organization of opposition parties, pressure from
within the Armed Forces, and by the pressure of countries that saw this election as important
(Boas, 2015; González and Prem, 2018, 2020). As a consequence, presidential elections were
held in 1989 and (as expected) a central left coalition won and took power in March 1990.
In the following decades of democracy, Pinochet’s privatization process has been gener-
ally considered as successful by the international economic community (Galal et al., 1994). In
Chile, however, some privatizations have generated significant controversy in the political and
academic sphere. The heart of this controversy lies in investigations suggesting that several
9More details about the sales can be found in Marcel (1989) and Hachette and Lüders (1992).
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state-owned firms were sold underpriced to buyers who were socially connected with the dic-
tatorship (Marcel, 1989; Congress Report, 2004; Mönckeberg, 2015).10 Perhaps the most well-
known example corresponds to the sale of the Chemical and Mining Society of Chile (SQM),
the largest Chilean non-metallic mining company, which was sold to Julio Ponce-Lerou, at the
time Pinochet’s son in law and previous manager of the Production Development Corporation.
Besides Ponce-Lerou, several other firms were also sold to “connected buyers,” i.e. people who
had worked with the Pinochet dictatorship in the years before the privatization. During the
dictatorship and the transition periods, many of these connected buyers acted as board mem-
bers in these firms. When democracy arrived, these firms used a variety of strategies to retain
their power using political networks, hiring politicians of the Pinochet regime, politicians of the
newly-elected coalition in power, and engaging in campaign finance (Bucheli and Salvaj, 2014;
González et al., 2020).
3 Conceptual framework
We use the historical background to provide a framework that guides the empirical analysis. We
describe the players, the payoffs, and the economic environment. We then study the decision
making process of players and discuss our main hypotheses.
3.1 Environment, business agents, and the government
Let there be j ∈ J state-owned firms being sold by a government. We assume that the decision
to sell these firms is exogenous and we think of it as the government following the advice of a
team of economists.11 The objective of the economic advisers is to increase the productivity of
firms in the economy. The goal of the government is to maximize revenues from the privatiza-
tion process R ≡
∑
j∈J p j and to maximize political support to remain in power, as in Biais and
Perotti (2002). We assume firms can help the government to stay in power by building support
in the business world. The price p j at which a state-owned firm j is sold is endogenous.
As potential buyers of these firms there are i ∈ I business agents. Agents are characterized
10Marcel (1989) estimates that in the sale of the 12 largest public companies in 1986 and 1987 the underpricing
ranged from 50% to 64% of total asset value of those firms, which corresponds to more than 4% of GDP in 1987
(Meller, 1993). Relatedly, González et al. (2020) provide the first firm-level estimates of the relationship between
sale underpricing and the identity of buyers (connected vs. unconnected).
11Although this assumption is a clear limitation, it simplifies the analysis considerably. Empirically we argue
that this decision is more likely to be exogenous after conditioning on a relevant set of observable variables.
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by two variables. First, some agents are part of existing business groups. We represent an
agent’s group affiliation by bi ∈ {0, 1}. Second, some agents are connected to the government.
We denote this link by gi ∈ {0, 1}. Connected agents are better than unconnected ones at building
political support for the government. The characteristics of agents xi ≡ (bi, gi) are exogenous.
Importantly, we assume that business agents make decisions to maximize their total wealth Ai.
Agents can potentially increase their initial wealth ai by acquiring state-owned firms.
3.2 Privatization
Let us now turn to the privatization of firm j. If a business agent i decides to acquire a state-
owned firm j, he or she obtains the following payoff:
πi j = V j(xi) − (1 − φi)p j(xi) − φi p j(xi)(1 + ri) (1)
where V j(xi) is the net present value of firm j when acquired by agent i, φi ∈ [0, 1] is the percent-
age of external funding used to buy the firm, and ri is the interest rate.12 As a consequence of
this purchase, his new wealth level is Ai = ai +πi j. If an agent i decides not to buy a firm, he ob-
tains the outside option w that without loss of generality we normalize to zero. When deciding
to buy firm j in the privatization process, an agent i faces the following budget constraint:
p j(xi) ≤ ai + m(xi) (2)
where m(xi) is the amount of resources that agent i can obtain in the financial sector, which
depends on his publicly known characteristics xi.
In terms of the agents wealth and access to external funding we assume that ai = a(bi, gi)
and mi = m(ai). In particular, agents who are part of an existing business group (bi = 1)
were severely hit by an exogenous economic crisis and thus their initial wealth is ai = a. For
simplicity, let all agents in groups be unconnected to the government (gi = 0). This assumption
is in line with the fact that before the crisis existing business groups were mostly bank-based,
had high debt levels, and thus the currency devaluation hit them particularly hard (Rojas, 2015,
p. 61). Let stand-alone and connected agents (bi = 0 and gi = 1) to have initial wealth ai = a,
and stand-alone unconnected agents to have wealth ai = a > a. Following the literature we let
the banking sector to (i) lend more to agents with more wealth due to a collateral channel (e.g.
12As described by Hachette and Lüders (1992), many firms were bought using external funding.
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Bernanke and Gertler 1989), and (ii) lend at a lower interest rate to connected agents (Khwaja
and Mian, 2005). For simplicity let mi = m if ai = a, and mi = m > m if ai = a.
The government perfectly observes agents’ types before the privatization and maximizes
the revenues R ≡
∑
j∈J p j and its chances of remaining in power. The revenue maximization
problem and the publicly known types imply that equation (2) is binding. Therefore the gov-
ernment is always more likely to sell state-owned firms to stand-alone business agents (bi = 0)
than group-affiliated agents (bi = 1) because a + mi(xi) > a + m ∀i ∈ I. In addition, the political
objective of the government creates a trade-off in which they are willing to forgo revenue in
exchange of political returns. Thus the government also sells (at least some) state-owned firms
to connected agents despite the lower revenue obtained from this transaction.13
3.3 After privatization
As a result of the privatization process, business agents experience a change in their wealth.
Stand-alone unconnected agents grow their wealth to A1 ≡ a + πi j. Stand-alone connected
agents, on the other hand, also experience an increase in their wealth but to a somewhat lower
level A2 ≡ a + πi j < A1. After the transition to democracy, the banking sector evaluates uncon-
nected agents similarly and hence their external sources of funding remain similar. However,
as shown by González and Prem (2020) connected agents lost their political connections and
thus their privileged access to the banking sector. As a result of this change, we hypothesize
that stand-alone unconnected agents will use the newly acquired firm as a source of funding for
their future investment projects that aim to increase their wealth.
This simple conceptual framework suggests two hypotheses that can be tested empirically
with the firm-level data we constructed. First, stand-alone agents are more likely to buy state-
owned firms than previously established business groups. This prediction is an implication of
the negative effect that the economic crisis had on the existing business elite. The differential
effect of the crisis is explained by the fact that business groups that survived the Allende years
and the 1970s liberalization process were bank-based and thus severely affected by the devalu-
ation in June 1982 (Silva, 1996). In contrast, other business agents specialized in exports and
had low levels of debt (Rojas, 2015, p. 62). As most firms in our data are part of a business
group after the transition to democracy, this means that privatized firms are more likely to be a
13We take this insight from our related paper where we find that connected buyers indeed paid lower prices in
the privatization process. See González et al. (2020) for details.
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part of “new” business groups. Second, firms acquired by connected agents are more likely to
be used as a source of funding than firms acquired by unconnected agents. This prediction is
explained by the existence of a substitution effect from the banking sector to the existing capital
within the business group after the transition to democracy.
4 Data construction
We collected data for publicly traded firms operating in the period 1970-2005. These firms were
mandated to submit annual reports to the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, a regulatory
agency equivalent to the Securities and Exchange commission in the United States. The in-
formation that firms had to submit included balance sheets, income statements, and ownership
information.14 We collected these reports directly from the archives of the regulatory agency,
digitized thousands of reports we found, and transformed all monetary variables to 1998 Chilean
pesos using the price index of the Central Bank. The number of firms reporting to the agency
varies from year to year, but there were roughly two-hundred firms in 1985.
4.1 Privatized firms and control group
From the hundreds of firms that reported to the agency, we identified fifty companies that were
privatized by the Pinochet regime in the 1973-1988 period and for which there is detailed firm-
level data annually. We detected these firms by matching the names of all listed firms with
the list of the names of the approximately four-hundred firms privatized by the dictatorship.
The latter list can be found in a report produced by the Chilean Congress after the return to
democracy (Congress Report, 2004). In addition to these privatized firms, we also selected a
set of firms that operated during the same period of time, in the same industries, but remained
private throughout the period. More precisely, we included firms with reports before and after
the last year of privatization in its industry.15 We use these firms as a comparison group. As
we argue in the next section, it is likely that these companies would have been nationalized by
Salvador Allende in the absence of the 1973 coup. Hence, they could have been privatized by
the Pinochet regime, but the coup prevented this from being the case.
14Since 1985 the agency required all firms to submit the exact same information. In earlier years the submission
process was not standardized and hence the number of variables we observe is more limited.
15For example, let the privatization years of three firms in industry j be 1979, 1986, and 1987. Then, the control
group is composed by non-privatized firms with reports before 1987 and after 1990, the year of democratization.
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All in all, our final sample is composed by 79 firms: 50 firms privatized by the dictatorship
and 29 firms that remained private throughout the period. The number of firms in the latter
group is relatively small because many firms submit reports for only a few years and some have
missing reports. The focus on firms that remain private and submit reports throughout the period
guarantees that these are large and important firms. Examples of these firms include well-known
mining and electricity companies. Panel (b) in Figure 1 shows the number of privatizations by
year during the dictatorship. The first and second waves of privatizations are clearly visible.
Panel (c) in Figure 1 shows a similar distribution of privatizations in our sample.16
Finally, building on recent evidence showing that privatization reforms can be implemented
in different ways (Fisman and Wang, 2014), we use data to classify each privatization in one
of two categories: (i) firms sold to buyers who were “connected” to the Pinochet dictatorship,
and (ii) firms sold to “unconnected” buyers. Following González et al. (2020) we say a buyer
was connected if he worked for Pinochet before buying the firm. Operationally we take all
buyers and find the intersection with all secretaries of state and all high-ranked militaries in the
period 1973-1990, restricting attention to the period before each corresponding sale. We find
that 27% of firms in our data (21 out of 79) were sold to connected buyers and 37% (29 out of
79) to unconnected buyers. The majority of connected buyers were bureaucrats and a few were
members of Pinochet’s family.
4.2 Business group affiliation before and after the Pinochet regime
We detect business groups using official ownership information from the regulatory agency.
This information is easily accesible after 1990 and for the period before that year we proceed as
follows. The Santiago Stock Exchange produced a report with the names of all publicly traded
firms in the early 1970s (Santiago Stock Exchange, 1970) and information about the ownership
of firms at that time can be found in a book titled “The book of the 91 [firms]” (own translation,
Movimiento de Acción Popular 1972), constructed under the socialist government of Salvador
Allende with the goal of studying economic concentration (Salvaj and Couyoumdjian, 2016).
Using these data we follow the literature and define a business group as two or more listed firms
under the same controlling shareholder (Buchuk et al., 2014). Therefore, for each firm in our
data we observe their group affiliation status in 1970 and from 1990 onwards.
16As a robustness exercise we expanded the sample of firms in the control group by relaxing the “throughout
the period” requirement, increasing the number of control firms to 112. We find similar results.
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The scattered historical information suggests that business group affiliation was constant in
the decade before the arrival of the Pinochet regime. In an effort to understand business groups
before the Salvador Allende government, we were able to construct the group affiliation status of
listed firms in the year 1960. More precisely, we gathered and harmonized business ownership
information from the Santiago Stock Exchange (1960), Lagos (1962), and Aguirre (2017). The
list of publicly traded firms comes from Santiago Stock Exchange (1960), and firms’ group
affiliation comes from Lagos (1962) and Aguirre (2017). Table 1 presents the results from this
analysis, which reveals that less than a quarter of firms belonged to a business group in 1960.
Given that this number is similar in 1970, these numbers suggest that business group affiliation
was relatively constant before the Salvador Allende years.
Business groups can also be characterized by their layers. When firm A controls firm B and
C directly, we say the group has one layer. In contrast, when firm A controls firm B, and firm
B controls firm C, we say there are two layers because firm A controls firm C through firm B.
In 1990 we observe 48 firms as part of a business group, the average group had two layers, and
five groups consisted of only two listed firms (but potentially more non-listed firms).
Because our main focus is in the democracy period, we also classified the set of existing
business groups in 1990 in two categories. In the first category are those groups that existed
before the Pinochet regime, which we call old or traditional business groups. In the second
category are those that did not exist before the privatization process, which we call new busi-
ness groups. To classify business groups as new or old we make use of “The book of the 91
[firms]” mentioned in section 4. In particular, we take the set of business groups in 1990, find
the intersection with the set of business groups in 1970, and call those “old business groups.”
The remaining are “new business groups.” The outcomes are two, an indicator for firms that
belonged to a new business group in 1990, and an indicator for firms that belonged to traditional
business groups in the same year, mutually exclusive categories by definition.
4.3 The role of firms within groups: pyramids and internal capital markets
We measure the role of firms within groups using four variables, two related to pyramidal struc-
tures and two related to internal capital markets. The first outcome is the difference between
voting and cash-flow rights, which we call wedge ωi ∈ [0, 1]. To calculate voting and cash-flow
rights we use all stakes that the controlling shareholder has in each company. The second out-
come is an indicator for firms that were part of a pyramid (τi = {0, 1}). Pyramids can represent
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a solution for firms to ease financial constraints (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), but can also be
related to inefficiencies (Johnson et al., 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002; Larrain et al., 2019). We
follow the literature and say a pyramid exists if the group has more than one layer, which can
only occur if some firm in the group has a positive wedge. In 1990 we observe 27 firms as part
of a pyramid and these pyramids had 2.4 layers on average. The position of the firm within the
pyramid is then revealed by the firm’s own wedge: firms at the bottom have a ωi > 0.17
The third outcome detects firms that were Providers of credit by measuring the percentage
of years in the period 1991-2005 that the firm provided intra-group net loans larger than 5%
of their assets, κi ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, the fourth outcome detects firms that were Receivers of
intra-group net loans smaller than -5% of their assets in the same period κi ∈ [0, 1]. Buchuk
et al. (2014) measure the functioning of internal capital markets in the same way. A total of 55
(40) firms were providers (receivers) at least one year during this period. Scholars have found
internal capital markets to be crucial for the performance of firms around the world in the 1990s
and 2000s, particularly during the Asian and Euro crises (Gopalan et al., 2007; Almeida et al.,
2015; Santioni et al., 2020; Buchuk et al., 2020).
Figure 2 presents a graphical summary of these four outcomes. We detect whether a firm
belongs to a group using ownership data. A stand-alone firm (gi = 0) has the same voting and
cash-flow rights (ωi = 0), and it is not a provider nor receiver of capital, κi ≡ [κi, κi] = [0, 0].
If a firm is part of a business group (gi = 0) then the group can potentially be organized as a
pyramid. We say firm i is part of a pyramid (τi = 1) if voting and cash-flow rights differ for
some firm in the group, regardless of whether cash-flow and voting rights differ for the firm
itself (ωi ≥ 0). If ω j = 0 for all firms j in the group, then we say the group is not organized as
a pyramid. A firm i within a group could be a provider or a receiver of capital within the group
(κi ≥ 0) regardless of the existence of a pyramidal structure.
17“[I]n a pyramid an ultimate owner uses indirect ownership to maintain control over a large number of com-
panies” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003, p. 478), a common strategy outside of the U.S. (La Porta et al., 1999).
Pyramids are controversial in Chile as some individuals involved in Pinochet’s privatizations were legally charged
of using complex ownership structures to extract financial benefits (SVS, 2014). Figure A.2 presents as an example
the Chemical and Mining Society of Chile (SQM), nowadays the world’s biggest lithium producer (The Economist,
2017) and controlled by a pyramid formed by listed and non-listed firms.
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5 Empirical framework
This section describes firms before privatization and, informed by this descriptive evidence, it
then presents our empirical strategy to estimate the contribution of the privatization process to
the formation of business groups and the role of firms within these groups.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
We begin by describing business groups in 1960 and 1970. Table 1 shows that 22% of firms
were part of a business group. The transportation industry and financial firms show the highest
percentage of business groups affiliation, with 75% and 50% of firms being part of a group re-
spectively. This table also shows that almost 50% of publicly traded firms were part of the man-
ufacturing industry, representing 37% of market capitalization. Other important industries were
“Agriculture, forestry, and fishing” with 24% of market capitalization and “Financial services”
with 11%. In 1960 we also observe that 22% of firms were affiliated to a group. Moreover, the
distribution of group affiliation is similar across industries in 1960 and 1970.
Given the importance of unobserved industry characteristics in explaining business owner-
ship structures and the intensity of the privatization reform, our empirical analysis will only
compare firms within industries. Moreover, our empirical strategy also exploits the 1982-1983
economic crisis as a shock to existing business groups, a crisis which affected mostly between-
industry (instead of within industry) allocational efficiency (Oberfield, 2013). We classify firms
into industries using Standard Industry Classification (four-digit SIC) codes. Table 2 presents
the number of firms in our sample across industries. Column 1 shows that firms in our data
operate in a diverse set of industries. Manufacturing is the most important one with 34 firms.
Columns 2-4 split firms by privatization status. The distribution of privatizations is fairly bal-
anced across industries: 26% of manufacturing firms were sold to connected buyers, 32% were
sold to unconnected buyers, and 41% were not privatized.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for firms in our sample, before (panel B) and after (panel
A) the dictatorship period. Panel A shows that after the return to democracy in 1990 a total of
57% and 61% of firms were part of a pyramid and a business group respectively (45 and 48
out of 79 firms). The lower panel shows that 36% of firms belonged to a business group in
1970. Figure 3 presents the evolution of business ownership. The statization process in the
early 1970s can be clearly observed as an increase in state owned firms in 1974. The second
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wave of privatizations that started in 1983 gradually returned all these firms to private hands by
the end of 1990.
Table 4 presents differences between firms by privatization status. Columns 1 and 4 show
averages for privatized and non-privatized firms. Column 5 presents the statistical difference
between these groups, with and without adjustment for small sample inference (Robinson and
Robinson, 2001). Although privatized firms were larger than non-privatized, the two groups
were similar in terms of their profitability, leverage, age, and business ownership in 1970 and
1983. Columns 2 and 3 compare firms that were privatized but that differed in their buyer
connectedness. Column 6 present the corresponding statistical difference. Firms sold to con-
nected buyers were smaller than those sold to unconnected buyers, but were similar in terms
of their profitability, leverage, age, and ownership structure before privatization. Finally, in the
appendix we present suggestive evidence that is consistent with the role of connections: (i) con-
nected buyers seem to have benefited from underpricing, as revealed by privatization prices and
book values; (ii) connected buyers were more likely to acquire firms after the 1982 economic
crisis, when traditional business groups were economically debilitated (Tables A.2-A.3).
Overall, the main difference between types of firms was their size. Therefore, our econo-
metric strategy will control for the logarithm of assets and sales, as well as by firm leverage and
return over equity, all of these measured before the privatization process began.
5.2 Econometric strategy
Our primary goal is to estimate the contribution of privatization to the formation of business
groups, and the role of privatized firms within groups. To fix ideas, let us begin discussing the
workhorse regression specification we use to relate these variables:
Yi j = β Privatizationi + γ′xi + η j + εi j (3)
where Yi j is an outcome of interest for firm i, which operates in industry j. We use three sets
of dependent variables. First, an indicator that takes the value of one for firms that were part
of a business group. The second set is composed by two variables that measure pyramidal
ownership: an indicator for firms that were part of a pyramid, and an indicator for positive
differences between cash and voting rights. And in the third set we have two variables that
measure the involvement of firms within business groups: a variable measuring which firms
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provided intra-group loans, and a similar variable for firms receiving loans within groups. We
measure business group affiliation in 1990 to capture how firms fare immediately after the dic-
tatorship period, and how firms operate within groups as an average in 15 years of democracy
(1991-2005) to capture fundamentals of group dynamics instead of idiosyncratic variation.
It is important to highlight the characteristics of non-privatized firms, the control group that
acts as a counterfactual for privatized firms in our empirical strategy. As discussed in section
4.1, these firms are also relatively large companies that report annually to the regulatory agency
but were not part of the privatization process implemented by Pinochet. Importantly, these firms
could have been privatized by the Pinochet dictatorship if Salvador Allende stayed in power, i.e.
in the absence of a coup. Allende’s economic plan revealed that his goal was to transform all
large businesses into state property (Popular Unity, 1969, p. 19-20).18 However, the timing
in which firms were chosen to be nationalized or privatized was far from random, thus it is
important to account for differences across firms. In any case, it is useful to think about non-
privatized firms as companies that could have been privatized if Salvador Allende spent more
years in power.
The main variable of interest in equation (3) is Privatizationi, an indicator that takes the
value of one if firm i was privatized during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) and zero
otherwise. Equation (3) also includes a vector xi with pre-determined firm-level variables that
could have been related to the privatization process and have the potential to affect our outcomes
in the short- and long-run, i.e. the logarithm of assets, the logarithm of sales, the firm’s leverage,
and its return over equity. In the case of privatized firms, we compute each of these variables
as a three-year average before the year of privatization. We do this to decrease the role of
annual anomalies unrelated to firm’s fundamental characteristics. In the case of non-privatized
(control) firms this benchmark year is absent and so we use three-year averages before the
maximum year of privatization in the firm’s industry, but results are robust to other definitions.
To capture differences in the evolution of business ownership and profitability that are related
to industry-level differences, equation (3) also includes a full set of industry fixed effects η j.
Finally, εi j is an error term with a mean of zero and robust to heteroskedasticity.
We begin by estimating equation (3) using ordinary least squares. The coefficient of inter-
18The economic plan reveals that the following companies and industries were to be state property (or part
of the “Social Property Area”): (1) the mining industry, (2) the financial industry, (3) exporting firms, (4) large
companies and distribution monopolies, (5) industrial monopolies, (6) all companies that contribute to the social
and economic development of the country. The plan was approved in December of 1969 by all political parties that
were part of the Popular Unity coalition. Own translation from Popular Unity (1969).
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est is β̂ and captures the differential evolution of privatized firms. The comparison are other
(non-privatized) firms in the same industry after adjusting for the effect of pre-privatization
characteristics xi. The main threat to interpret β̂ as the causal effect of privatization are potential
omitted variables that explain both why a firm was privatized and the outcomes under study. For
these omitted variables to be a threat they need to be firm-specific (instead of industry-specific)
and unrelated to observables, otherwise their effects are captured by xi and η j. To assess this
possibility we complement the analysis with three matching estimates that aim to produce im-
proved comparisons, we use additional control variables, different regression specifications, and
finally we employ the method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and extended by Oster (2019)
to gauge the potential effects of unobservables.
In addition to equation (3) we also present estimates from a regression specification that al-
lows different types of privatizations to have potentially different effects on business ownership
and internal capital markets. This decision is motivated by a recent empirical literature that
shows privatizations can be implemented in different manners, with some firms sold to buyers
who are socially close to the seller or at reduced prices (Fisman and Wang, 2014; González
et al., 2020). Because firms might have been sold at different prices precisely because the buyer
was close to the government, we use the identity of the buyer as the main source of heterogene-
ity. In particular, we augment equation (3) with an interaction term and estimate the following
regression equation using ordinary least squares:
Yi j = φ1 Privatizationi + φ2 (Privatizationi × Connectedi) + γ′xi + η j + εi j (4)
where all variables are defined as in equation (3) and Connectedi is an indicator that takes the
value of one if firm i was sold to a connected buyer. When using this specification the coeffi-
cients of interest are φ1 and φ2. The former measures the effect of “unconnected” privatizations
on the outcomes of interest, and the latter measures the differential effect for “connected” pri-
vatizations. If we estimate that φ̂2 ≈ 0, then both types of privatizations had similar effects.
6 Main results
The first part of this section shows that privatized firms are more likely to belong to new business
groups after the transition to democracy, particularly those sold after the 1982 crisis. The second
part shows that firms bought by connected buyers were more likely to be placed at the bottom
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of pyramids and used as a source of capital within groups. We end this section by showing that
these results are robust to the use of a variety of alternative estimation strategies.
6.1 Privatized firms and business groups
Table 5 presents estimates of equations (3) and (4) using three different measures of business
groups as dependent variables. In particular, the outcomes are indicators that are equal to one
if the firm was affiliated to a business group (columns 1 and 2), a new business group (columns
3 and 4), or an old business group (columns 5 and 6). Therefore, all coefficients correspond to
estimates from linear probability models. If a firm is part of an old business group, we argue that
this firm was bought by an existing business group at the time of the privatization. In contrast, if
a firm is part of a new business group, we argue it was bought by an agent unrelated to previous
groups. These dependent variables are always measured in 1990, the first year of democracy
after the Pinochet dictatorship.
Column 1 in Table 5 shows that firms privatized by Pinochet were 47 percentage points more
likely to be part of a business group in the year 1990. Column 2 in the same panel allows for
heterogeneous effects by buyer connectedness and reveals that this increase in business group
affiliation is similar across firms sold to connected and unconnected individuals. For a better
understanding of the magnitude of this estimate consider that 41% of non-privatized firms (12
out of 29) belonged to a business group during this period. Therefore, the privatization process
doubled the probability that a firm was part of a business group, an economically large effect.
It is important to understand whether firms became part of traditional or new business
groups. If most state-owned firms were being bought by traditional business groups then the
sale of state-owned firms was a way to regain or consolidate the economic power of existing
business elites. In contrast, if firms were bought by new business groups then these reforms pro-
vided an opportunity for the creation of new economic elites. Which business groups are more
prone to buy firms during privatization, or if new business groups form around the purchase of
state-owned firms, are to the best of our knowledge open empirical questions.19
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 reveal that most firms privatized by Pinochet that ended being
part of a business group were part of groups that did not exist before the dictatorship. Columns
19A similar process to renovate business elites seemed to have occurred in Japan, with new zaibatsus like Toyota
and Nissan forming to replace traditional groups (Hadley, 1970). Descriptive evidence from post-Apartheid South
Africa, Malaysia, and Russia also fit into this narrative (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).
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5 and 6 confirm this result, old business groups were not buying state-owned firms more than
non-privatized firms. Recall that the comparison group are other non-privatized firms in the
same industry. For reference, none of these control firms in our estimating sample were part
of new business groups and 41% of them were or became part of old groups. Then the fact
that 37% of firms privatized by Pinochet became part of new business groups is economically
meaningful. We again find little heterogeneity by the type of privatization process as measured
by buyer connectedness.20 Overall, results in Table 5 support the hypothesis that privatizations
contributed to the formation of new business groups.
Why were privatized firms contributing to the formation of new business groups? Why were
traditional business groups not buying these firms? If buying is a dominant strategy, then old
business groups might have faced some restriction to buy. This is a hard question to answer
empirically but in our conceptual framework we suggest that the 1982 economic crisis might
have acted as a financial restriction for traditional business groups. Some evidence for this
mechanism can be found in the fact that most firms that became part of new business groups
were bought after the 1982 crisis, a time in which financial restrictions might have been binding
for traditional business groups (Silva, 1996; Rojas, 2015). In this sense, the evidence suggests
that the interaction between an economic crisis and a privatization reform might at least partially
facilitate the renovation of business elites.21
Table 6 presents some suggestive patterns for the role played by the 1982 crisis. In this
table we repeat the estimation of equation (3), but separate the privatization indicator in two,
one for firms privatized before the crisis and one for firms privatized afterwards. To determine
which year represents the period after the crisis is difficult, so we take the patterns in panel (a)
in Figure 1 and use two definitions: the period after 1984 (odd columns) and the years after
1985 (even columns). The structure of the table mimics the previous one for completeness,
but columns 3-6 present the patterns that we argue are consistent with the role of the crisis.
These columns show that when firms were privatized after the crisis, the probability of a firm
becoming part of a new business group increased more than when firms where privatized before
the crisis (40-43 vs. 24-28 percentage points), although given the small sample the difference is
not statistically significant at conventional levels. Remarkably, we observe the reversed pattern
20In the appendix we show that the results remain unchanged in terms of statistical significance if we consider
a longer time horizon and measure the dependent variables in the period 1991-2005 instead of 1990 (see Table
A.5). The results are also robust to define business groups as three or more (instead of two or more) listed firms
controlled by the same shareholder (Table A.6). In both cases the magnitude of coefficients also remains similar.
21We acknowledge there could be additional mechanisms at play. For example, traditional groups might simply
have a comparative advantage that perhaps was unlikely to be a good match for privatized firms.
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when we look at traditional business groups: firms sold before the crisis were 34 percentage
points more likely to become part of an old business groups, and the difference is statistically
significant at conventional levels in column 6 (p-value 0.03). Overall, we interpret this evidence
with caution given the small sample but as indicative of the role played by the crisis.
Importantly, after the transition to democracy in 1990 we observe that traditional and new
business groups differed in the way they were organized and operated. To characterize them
we use records from the regulatory agency for all firms in the new and old groups in our data.
When compared to new groups, we observe that the old ones operated in more industries (3.2
versus 2.2), had simpler structure (measured by the number of layers, 2.3 versus 3.4), and were
composed significantly more by family firms (82 versus 20%, as defined by Donelli et al. 2013).
Of course, some of these differences might be the consequence of the privatization reform, and
some might reflect inherent differences in their comparative (or competitive) advantage.
6.2 Privatized firms, pyramids, and capital within groups
In section 3 we argue that firms acquired by agents linked to the government might end up be-
ing used as a source of funding. The mechanism behind this argument is a substitution from
preferential access to the banking sector to sources of capital within the group. This section
tests this hypothesis using three variables that measure how firms operate within groups: pyra-
midal ownership, separation between cash and voting rights, and capital markets within groups.
Because our focus is now on the functioning of business groups during the democracy period,
we measure these variables in the fifteen-year period 1991-2005. This measurement strategy
allows us to observe the behavior of groups over an extended period of time.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 repeat the previous estimations using as dependent variable the
indicator for firms that were part of a pyramid. To facilitate the interpretation of these linear
probability estimates consider that 38% of non-privatized firms were part of a pyramid in the
1991-2005 period. Column 1 shows that for privatized firms this percentage increases by 29
percentage points, an economically large effect that is also statistically significant. In contrast
to the business group results, column 2 reveals that most of this effect is explained by the set
of firms sold to buyers who worked for the Pinochet dictatorship before privatization. Columns
3 and 4 use the indicator for positive differences between cash and voting rights (wedge) as
dependent variable. We find that in privatized firms there was more likely to be a wedge between
ownership and control, but only among those sold to connected buyers, suggesting these firms
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were placed at the bottom of the pyramid. Wedges and pyramids potentially allow the largest
shareholder to control a firm despite having low cash flow rights, and has been linked in the
literature to lower valuations (Claessens et al., 2002).
Next we study the role of newly privatized firms within their business group. To measure
their role we use the Providers and Receivers variables, i.e. indicators for firms who provide or
receive capital to or from other firms in the group (see section 4.3). Estimates of equation (3) in
columns 5 and 7 show that experiencing a privatization is not associated with a differential role
within the group. Privatized firms are on average equally likely to be providers or receivers of
capital within business groups after the transition to democracy. However, estimates of equation
(4) in column 6 reveal that the subset of firms sold to connected buyers were significantly more
likely to become providers of capital within their business group. Almost 50% of firms sold
to connected buyers transformed into providers of credit in their business group, a result that
is statistically significant (p-value< 0.05). In contrast, columns 7 and 8 show that privatized
firms were not more likely to become receivers within their group, with an economically small
coefficient.22
6.3 Robustness of results
This section shows that previous results are robust to specification decisions and estimation
methods. Main results are presented in Table 8 and for brevity we leave the remaining exercises
for the appendix (see Tables A.8-A.11). We begin by showing that results are similar when
we use three different matching exercises to minimize concerns about potential unobservables
driving our results. Then for a subsample of firms we are able to show that results are robust
to controlling for group affiliation in 1970, before the statization and privatization processes.
We also report results dropping firms with takeovers, using a different definition of connected
buyers, and extending the sample to include additional firm-level controls. Finally, we use the
Altonji et al. (2005) approach and report estimated coefficients that account for potential effect
of unobservables using the method proposed by Oster (2019).
The reader might worry about the role of potential omitted variables correlated with pri-
vatizations and business ownership. Two sets of exercises suggest that this is unlikely to be a
concern. First, we use three matching estimators with the goal of making better comparisons
22Note that when measuring these four outcomes – pyramid, wedge, provider, receiver – we are assigning a
value of zero to stand-alone firms. Table A.7 shows that results are similar when we condition the estimation to
the subset of firms that were part of a business group after the return to democracy.
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across firms and results are similar. These matching estimators use the probability of a priva-
tization, estimated using pre-privatizations variables and industry effects. Column 1 follows
Crump et al. (2009) and truncate the propensity score distribution, eliminating a few firms with-
out close comparisons. In addition, column 2 uses this propensity score as an additional control,
and column 3 chooses the comparison firms with the k-nearest neighbors approach (with k = 1).
In all of these cases we observe similar results than before.
Second, we follow the Altonji et al. (2005) approach and use the statistical power of observ-
able variables that could be correlated with unobservables to adjust our estimates in order to
account for the effect of potentially omitted variables. This approach was recently formalized
by Oster (2019) and we use her method to adjust the estimated coefficients. In our context, this
method could be interpreted as a selection model in which the privatization decision depends
on both observables and unobservables that are correlated with the observables. Reassuringly,
column 6 shows that the adjusted coefficients remain similar to previous estimates.
The results are also similar when we control for group affiliation before the beginning of
the Pinochet dictatorship and when we drop firms with takeovers. For the former exercise we
had to match firms in our data with the set of firms with business group affiliation data in 1970
(see section 5.1). We were able to find 36 out of the 79 firms.23 Operationally we include as
an additional control an indicator variable that is equal to one for firms affiliated to a business
group in 1970. Column 4 shows that most results remain unchanged, although the smaller
sample decreases the statistical power of the analysis. Results are also similar if we drop from
estimation the few firms with takeovers during the 1990-2005 period (column 5). Although the
relatively small sample reduces the statistical significance of the estimates, results taken as a
whole point in a similar direction than before. Similarly, the appendix shows that results are
similar if we control for pre-privatization differences in a flexible way by including indicators
for quartiles for the firm size distribution as measured by assets (Tables A.12-A.14).
Finally, the results are similar if we use an alternative definition for connected buyers and if
we use an extended sample of firms. As an alternative definition of connected buyers we con-
sider the names of eight firms mentioned in two well known investigations studying Pinochet’s
privatization process (Marcel, 1989; Mönckeberg, 2015). Importantly, these firms are part of
our sample as connected privatizations. Column 7 shows that all results are similar if we use
this alternative definition. Column 8 uses an extended sample in which we include additional
23The remaining firms were not listed and hence were not mandated to report their ownership. Then we are
unable to observe if these firms were part of some business group before 1973.
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firms in the control group. To expand this group we relaxed the restriction that a firm needs to
be observed three years before the last privatization year in its industry. For this exercise we
use not-privatized firms with information for at least one year before the return to democracy
in 1990 (see section 4 for details). As “pre-privatization” controls we use the average over the
first three years (or fewer years depending on the information available in the reports). The
estimated coefficients are again similar.
7 Conclusion
We used new firm-level data to show how the privatization process implemented by a group of
economists known as the “Chicago Boys” during the 1973-1990 dictatorship led by Augusto
Pinochet contributed to the formation of new business groups in modern democratic Chile. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically show how a privatization reform
might contribute to the formation of new business groups, arguably fostering the replacement of
elites. In addition, we also show that when firms were sold to connected buyers some of these
firms began to act as providers of credit within their groups and pyramids were built on top of
them. We argue that the context and which privatizations took place – i.e. after an economic
crisis – and the way in which these were implemented can explain most of these results.
The history of privatizations in Chile provides at least two valuable lessons. First, as sug-
gested by Schneider (2010), policies can create important changes in the structure of organiza-
tions and these changes can persist over time. In this sense our analysis complements that of
Kandel et al. (2019) who show that government policies can contribute to the disappearance
of business groups. Besides expanding their work to an empirical analysis of the appearance
of groups, we also note that policies can foster a replacement of elites, create corporate em-
pires, and contribute to the concentration of economic power in the hands of few entrepreneurs,
which might or might not be of interest for a country depending on the economic context, the
development process, and the potential benefits of a “big push” (Morck and Nakamura, 2007).
Second, the impact of privatizations on the formation of business groups and pyramidal
ownership structures calls for a reassessment of the costs and benefits of these reforms. When
selling state-owned firms it is important to evaluate the intended policy impacts taking into ac-
count “general equilibrium” effects caused by the formation of new organizational structures
in the economy. For example, privatizations might have the objetive of increasing economic
performance and productivity more generally, but the creation of groups can increase the con-
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centration in an industry and potentially increase market power, increase prices, and even lower
wages (Jarosch et al., 2019). Because of this, potential restrictions to the identity of buyers are
perhaps of interest for governments when implementing these reforms.
The study of the unintended impacts of privatizations and government policies on organiza-
tions is a promising area of future research as there are many open questions. Can government
policies unintentionally increase market power? To what extent can these policies affect the
structure of organizations? What are their long-run impacts on productivity and economic per-
formance? What are the impacts on consumers? Can the temporary creation of business groups
help economies by creating a “big push”? If business groups benefitted as a whole after buying
or forming around state-owned firms is yet another important question. How long will these
firms remain in their respective groups and what factors will affect the survival rate of different
business groups, remain open questions.
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(c) Our data of privatized firms
Notes: Panel (a) plots the time series of GDP per capita in Chile during the Pinochet years.
Panel (b) plots the number of privatizations per year in the same period. Panel (c) shows the
distribution of privatizations per year in our dataset. All panels highlight in light gray the period
in which the country experienced the economic crisis. Sources: GDP per capita data from Dı́az
et al. (2016), data on the number of privatizations by year from Congress Report (2004) and in
sample is own construction using data from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
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ωi ≥ 0, κi ≥ 0
ωi = 0, κi ≥ 0
ωi = 0, κi = 0
Notes: This figure presents how we measure the role of firms within groups. We detect whether
a firm belongs to a group using firm ownership data. A stand-alone firm (gi = 0) has the same
voting and cash-flow rights (ωi = 0), and it is not a provider nor receiver of capital within the
group (κi = [κi, κi] = [0, 0]). If a firm is part of a group (gi = 0) then the group can potentially
be organized as a pyramid. We say firm i is part of a pyramid (τi = 1) if voting and cash-flow
rights differ for some firm in the group, regardless of whether cash-flow and voting rights differ
for the firm itself (ωi ≥ 0). If ω j = 0 for all firms j in the group, then the group is not organized
as a pyramid. A firm within a group can always be provider or receiver of capital within the
group (κ ≥ 0) regardless of the potential pyramidal structure.
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(b) Number of business groups
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of business groups in the period 1960-1990. We highlight
the Salvador Allende years (1970-1973) in light gray. The Pinochet years are between 1973 and
1990. Sources: Own construction using data from administrative records in the Santiago Stock
Exchange (1960, 1970), and archival work by Lagos (1962), Movimiento de Acción Popular
(1972), and Aguirre (2017). We provide more details about these data in section 4.
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Table 1: Publicly traded firms and group affiliation in 1960 and 1970
All publicly traded firms in: Group member firms in:
1960 1970 1960 1970
Number Percentage Number Percentage Percentage of Percentage of
of firms of firms (%) of firms of firms (%) group members (%) group members (%)
Industry : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accommodation and food services 1 0.5 1 0.5 0 0
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 21 11.4 23 10.6 28.6 34.8
Construction 5 2.7 8 3.7 20 12.5
Electricity and gas 2 1.1 5 2.3 0 0
Financial and insurance activities 15 8.1 15 6.9 53.3 46.7
Information and communication 2 1.1 2 0.9 0 0
Manufacturing 89 48.1 107 49.3 19.1 23.4
Mining and quarrying 29 15.7 21 9.7 20.7 9.5
Real estate activities 4 2.2 11 5.1 25 9.1
Transportation and storage 5 2.7 4 1.8 60 75.0
Wholesale and retail trade 12 6.5 20 9.2 0 5.0
Total 185 100 217 100 22.7 22.1
Notes: This table presents the distribution of all publicly traded firms in 1960 and 1970 across industries (columns 1-4) and of the
subsample of these firms that were affiliated to a business group in those years (columns 5–6). Sources: The list of publicly traded
firms comes from records of the Santiago Stock Exchange (1960, 1970) and business group affiliation data come from Lagos (1962),
Movimiento de Acción Popular (1972), and Aguirre (2017). More details in section 4.
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Industry: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Accommodation and food services 1 0 0 1
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 9 2 1 6
Construction 1 0 1 0
Electricity and gas 13 5 7 1
Health 1 0 0 1
Information and communication 4 1 3 0
Manufacturing 34 9 11 14
Mining and quarrying 7 3 2 2
Real state activity 2 0 0 2
Transportation and storage 5 1 3 1
Wholesale and retail trade 2 0 1 1
Number of firms: 79 21 29 29
Notes: This table shows the distribution of firms in our data by industry. Columns 2-3 constitute the main group of interest (privatized
firms) and column 4 characterizes the set of firms in the control group. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of
time but remained private throughout these years. We classify all of these firms into industries using Standard Industry Classification
(four-digit SIC) codes. Sources: Own construction based on data from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros and standard-
industry classification codes. More details in section 4.
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90th pctile 10th pctile
Number
of firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcomes after dictatorship
Owned by business group in 1990 0.61 0.49 1 0 79
Owned by new business group in 1990 0.15 0.36 1 0 79
Owned by old business group in 1990 0.46 0.50 1 0 79
Part of a pyramid in 1991-2005 0.57 0.50 1 0 79
Wedge cash-voting rights in 1991-2005 0.51 0.50 1 0 79
Provider within group in 1991-2005 0.28 0.29 0.73 0 79
Receiver within group in 1991-2005 0.12 0.17 0.33 0 79
B. Pre-privatization
Logarithm of total assets 20.26 6.05 30.19 15.26 79
Logarithm of sales 18.88 6.94 29.11 13.61 79
Return over equity 0.15 0.19 0.39 -0.03 79
Leverage 0.43 0.26 0.83 0.08 79
Year of foundation 1940 31 1981 1902 79
Privatization year 1982 5 1988 1974 50
Owned by business group in 1960 0.30 0.47 1 0 27
Owned by business group in 1970 0.36 0.49 1 0 36
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional summary statistics for the 79 firms in our sample.
Panel A describes the outcome variables and panel B presents firm-level characteristics in the
pre-privatization period. Sources: Own construction using data from the Superintendencia de
Valores y Seguros and business group affiliation data from Lagos (1962), Movimiento de Acción
Popular (1972), and Aguirre (2017).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)–(4) (2)–(3)
Log assets 22.52 20.81 23.76 16.35 6.17*** -2.95*
(6.58) (5.09) (7.31) (1.18) (0.96) (1.75)
[0.00] [0.23]
Log sales 21.33 18.99 23.02 14.65 6.68*** -4.04**
(7.32) (6.71) (7.38) (3.34) (1.21) (2.00)
[0.00] [0.11]
Return over equity 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.04 -0.06
(0.19) (0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.04) (0.06)
[0.33] [0.13]
Leverage 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.45 -0.04 0.01
(0.24) (0.26) (0.23) (0.31) (0.07) (0.07)
[0.98] [0.99]
Year of foundation 1937 1944 1932 1945 -8 12
(33) (27) (37) (26) (7) (9)
[0.29] [0.22]
Bus. group in 1960 0.29 0.44 0.20 0.33 -0.04 0.24
(0.46) (0.53) (0.41) (0.58) (0.30) (0.20)
[0.73] [0.09]
Bus. group in 1970 0.38 0.50 0.31 0.30 0.08 0.19
(0.50) (0.53) (0.48) (0.48) (0.18) (0.20)
[0.88] [0.34]
Firms 50 21 29 29
Notes: This table presents the average and standard deviation of pre-privatization variables for
different subsets of firms in columns 1-4. Firms “Not privatized” constitute the control group
and are firms which operated during the same period of time but remained private through-
out these years. The last two columns present univariate regressions results to determine the
statistical significance of the differences between columns 1 and 4, and 2 and 3 respectively.
In these columns we present robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values correcting for
small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. Sources: Own construction using data from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros
and business group affiliation data from Lagos (1962), Movimiento de Acción Popular (1972),
and Aguirre (2017).
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Table 5: Privatization and business groups
Dependent variable: Indicator firm belongs to (new or old) business group in 1990
Any group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.47*** 0.38* 0.37*** 0.32** 0.09 0.06
(0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19)
[0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.03] [0.60] [0.77]
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.14 0.08 0.06
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
[0.36] [0.47] [0.74]
Firms 79 79 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.41
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional
estimates of the linear probability models in equations (3) and (4). All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time
but remained private throughout these years. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values
correcting for small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.1.
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Table 6: Privatization, economic crisis, and business groups
Dependent variable: Indicator firm belongs to (new or old) business group in 1990
Any group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized after the economic crisis 0.45*** 0.37* 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.05 -0.06
(0.17) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.34
(0.19) (0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.28) (0.22)
Firms 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.360 0.377 0.328 0.331 0.233 0.267
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X
Difference before and after (p-value) 0.54 0.12 0.38 0.37 0.24 0.03
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.41 0.41 0 0 0.41 0.41
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional estimates of an augmented version of the
linear probability model in equation (3). All privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated
during the same period of time but remained private throughout these years. We split the privatization years in those after and before
the economic crisis in the 1980s. The period after the economic crisis corresponds to the years after 1984 (1985) in odd (even)
columns. The period before the economic crisis are the years before 1984 (1985) in odd (even) columns. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.1.
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Table 7: Privatization, pyramids, and internal capital markets
Dependent variable: Pyramid Wedge Providers Receivers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.29* 0.04 0.16 -0.09 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
[0.07] [0.84] [0.36] [0.65] [0.35] [0.76] [0.38] [0.54]
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.39*** 0.38** 0.20** -0.02
(0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.05)
[0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.76]
Firms 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.13
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional estimates of the linear probability models
in equations (3) and (4). All privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same
period of time but remained private throughout these years. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values correcting for small
sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.2.
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New business group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.50*** 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.22 0.35** 0.80 0.37*** 0.19*
(0.16) (0.14) (0.08) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11)
Pyramid
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.03 0.01 0.24* 0.08 0.08 -0.23 0.26 -0.12
(0.25) (0.20) (0.13) (0.41) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.39* 0.36** 0.43** 0.56** 0.49*** 0.39 0.25** 0.48***
(0.21) (0.15) (0.17) (0.25) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12)
Wedge
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.27 -0.10 0.08 -0.16 -0.06 -0.38 0.14 -0.29**
(0.24) (0.21) (0.13) (0.41) (0.22) (0.19) (0.14)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.57*** 0.37** 0.43** 0.62** 0.53*** 0.50 0.13 0.45**
(0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14)
Providers
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.02
(0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.23) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.10 0.19** 0.23*** 0.16 0.08 0.22 0.45*** 0.19**
(0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
Firms 49 79 79 36 68 79 79 112
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from a different estimation strategy. All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time but remained private throughout these
years. Columns 1-3 offer three different matching estimators. Column 4 includes an additional control for group affiliation in 1970
(subsample with available information). Column 5 drops from the estimation the few firms with takeovers. Column 6 implements
the coefficient stability method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and extended by Oster (2019). Column 7 uses a different definition
of “connected buyers.” Finally, column 8 includes more firms in the control group by relaxing the data requirements. See section 6.3
for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A The Production Development Corporation
The Production Development Corporation – or CORFO due to its spanish acronym (Corpo-
ración de Fomento de la Producción en Chile) – was founded in 1939 under the government
of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941), remains nowadays an important part of the state, and
is perceived as an important partner of the business world. This public entity was created by
law number 6334, and intended to promote the country’s industrialization and development.
Although its intellectual roots can be found in the Great Depression in 1929, it was actually
created at the same time than the Reconstruction Corporation, which was in charge of helping
with the reconstruction after an earthquake hit the south of Chile (Chillán, January 1939).
The 1939-1970 period Initially, the Production Development Corporation was managed
by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the
President of the Central Bank, among others. Among the goals of the Corporation we found:
(i) formulate a plan promoting production, (ii) collaborate with the public and private sectors,
and (iii) promote consumption of national products, among others (Article N. 22). The leaders
of the Corporation made the electricity and steel sectors priority areas. The operations began
with what were known as Planes de Acción Inmediata (Immediate Action Plans) to mitigate
the earthquake’s impacts. These plans were followed by the creation of the National Elec-
tricity Company (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, ENDESA) and the Pacific Steel Com-
pany (Compañı́a de Aceros del Pacı́fico, CAP S.A.). In the 1960s the Corporation assisted
an important investment plan, creating the National Telecommunications Company (Empresa
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Entel) and the National Television (Televisión Nacional de
Chile, TVN), among others. All in all, the corporation acted as an ally of the private sector until
the victory of the Popular Unity in the 1970 presidential elections.
Appendix I in Hachette and Lüders (1992) provides the complete list of firms under the
umbrella of the Corporation in 1970, 1973, 1983 and 1989.
ii
Figure A.1: Business ownership data before 1970
(a) Movimiento de Acción Popular (1972) (b) Santiago Stock Exchange (1960, 1970)
iii
Figure A.2: An example of indirect control in a connected privatization
Julio Ponce Lerou Julio Ponce Lerou Julio Ponce Lerou Julio Ponce Lerou Julio Ponce Lerou
Norte Grande Norte Grande
Oro Blanco Oro Blanco Oro Blanco
Calichera Calichera Calichera Calichera
SQM SQM SQM SQM
SQM-A 7 out of 8
directors
V: 84 % C: 84 % V: 79 % C: 79 %
V: 47 % C: 47 % V: 47 % C: 40 % V: 47 % C: 37 %
V: 4 % C: 4 % V: 57 % C: 57 % V: 56 % C: 26 % V: 52 % C: 21 % V: 58 % C: 22 %
V: 20 % C: 11 % V: 20 % C: 5 % V: 29 % C: 6 %
V: 25 % C: 4 %
1986 1990 1991 1992 1993
Privatization Calichera’s IPO Oro Blanco’s IPO Norte Grande’s IPO ADR issuance, dual class
shares (SQM-B)
Dictatorship Democracy
Notes: This figure provides an example of the evolution of controlling stakes in the Chemical and Mining Society of Chile (SQM),
the largest Chilean non-metallic mining company which was privatized during the Pinochet years. This firm is an observation in our
data and corresponds to a firm bought by a “connected buyer.” Besides showing how indirect control appears over time, the figure
presents information about voting rights (in bold text, “V: x%”) and cash-flow rights (in bold italics, “C: x%”) in each year. Source:
Own construction using administrative data from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
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Table A.1: Definition of variables and sources
Definition Source
Sample (1) (2)
Universe of firms All Firms listed in Chile’s stock market (setA) SVS
Privatized firms Firms privatized by Pinochet and with reports (set B, with B ⊂ A) SVS, Congress Report (2004)
Control firms
Firms which operated at the same time than privatized firms but re-
mained private (set C, with C ⊂ A and C ∩ B = ∅) SVS
Outcomes
Business groups
Firms under the same controller belong to the same group. Controllers
own more than 50% of the firm. Detected using ownership data. SVS
Old business groups
Business groups operating before Pinochet (1960, 1970). Detected us-
ing ownership data.
Santiago Stock Exchange (1960, 1970);
Lagos (1962); Movimiento de Acción
Popular (1972); Aguirre (2017)
New business groups
Business groups operating after Pinochet which did not existed before.
Detected using ownership data. SVS minus old business groups
Pyramid
Indicator for firms part of a pyramid, detected when group has more
than two layers or some firm in group with wedge different than zero SVS
Wedge Indicator for difference between cash and voting rights greater than zero SVS
Provider Indicator for firms providing net loans larger than 5% of assets
Receiver Indicator for firms providing net loans smaller than -5% of assets
Pre-privatization variables
Assets Three-year average of assets before the year of privatization Balance sheets (SVS)
Return over equity Three-year average of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation Balance sheets (SVS)
Sales Three-year average of sales, measured in monetary units Balance sheets (SVS)
Leverage Three-year average of debt over assets before the year of privatization Balance sheets (SVS)
Other
Industries




Notes: This table presents definitions and sources for all variables used in the paper. Balance sheets and annual reports for each
firm-year come from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS).
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Table A.2: Additional results, underpricing and connected buyers
Dependent variable: Underpricing in privatization
(1) (2) (3)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.21* 0.20 0.24*
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Observations 50 50 50
R-squared 0.055 0.158 0.190
Industry fixed effects X X
Pre-privatization controls X
Avg. dep. variable (unconnected) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Notes: Each observation is a privatized firm. We define “Underpricing” as the ratio between
the difference in book value and privatization price per share over the book value per share.
Thus, higher positive values indicate more underpricing. González et al. (2020) show that this
underpricing measure is positively correlated with (1) the present value of future cash flows,
and (2) contemporaneous estimates of firm value done by international consulting companies.
All firms in our sample were privatized in the period 1973–1989. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A.3: Additional results, privatization year and connected buyers
Dependent variable: Indicator for firm sold to connected buyer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Privatized after the economic crisis 0.23* 0.39** 0.26* 0.37
(0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.25)
Privatized firms 50 50 50 50
Industry fixed effects X X
Pre-privatization controls X X
R-squared 0.06 0.28 0.07 0.25
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional
estimates of the linear probability model in equation (3) in the subsample of privatized firms. All
firms in the sample were privatized in the period 1973–1989. Significance level: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.1.
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Table A.4: Additional results, coefficients for controls
Dependent variable: Indicator firm belongs to business group in 1990
Any group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.47*** 0.38* 0.37*** 0.32** 0.09 0.06
(0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19)
[0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.03] [0.60] [0.78]
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.14 0.08 0.06
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
[0.36] [0.47] [0.72]
Log total assets before priv. 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Leverage before priv. -0.12 -0.11 0.07 0.08 -0.19 -0.18
(0.23) (0.23) (0.17) (0.17) (0.27) (0.28)
Log sales before priv. -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Return over equity before priv. -0.16 -0.14 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12
(0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.20) (0.30) (0.30)
Firms 79 79 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.41 0.41 0.07 0.07 0.55 0.55
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional
estimates of the linear probability models in equations (3) and (4). All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time
but remained private throughout these years. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values
correcting for small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.1.
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Table A.5: Robustness of results, privatization and business groups
Dep. variable: Indicator firm belongs to business group at some point in period 1991-2005
Any group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.28** 0.21 0.34** 0.27 -0.06 -0.06
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
[0.05] [0.18] [0.02] [0.10] [0.75] [0.76]
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.11 0.10 0.00
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16)
[0.40] [0.43] [0.97]
Firms 79 79 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.62 0.62 0.07 0.07 0.55 0.55
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional
estimates of the linear probability models in equations (3) and (4). All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time
but remained private throughout these years. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values
correcting for small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.1.
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Table A.6: Robustness of results, business group definition
Dependent variable: Indicator firm belongs to (new or old) business group in 1990
Any group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.46*** 0.40** 0.36*** 0.33** 0.10 0.08
(0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.09 0.05 0.04
(0.16) (0.13) (0.16)
Firms 79 79 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.35 0.35 0 0 0.35 0.35
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients are cross-sectional estimates of
the linear probability models in equations (3) and (4). Business groups are defined as three or
more (instead of two or more) listed firms controlled by the same shareholder. All privatizations
occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period
of time but remained private throughout these years. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.1.
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Table A.7: Robustness, role within groups
Pyramid Wedge Providers Receivers
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.25 0.07 0.17 -0.08 -0.03 -0.22 0.02 0.05
(0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.31) (0.16) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.23* 0.30* 0.24** -0.04
(0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.04)
Firms 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Avg. dep. variable (non-privatized) 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.07
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and coefficients correspond to cross-sectional estimates of the linear probability models
in equations (3) and (4). We focus on the subsample of firms that were part of a business group in 1990. All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time but remained private throughout these
years. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values correcting for small sample inference in square brackets. Significance level:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. More details in section 6.2.
xi

















Business group (eq. 3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.43** 0.44*** 0.18 0.34 0.41** 0.86 0.47*** 0.23
(0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.31) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14)
Business group (eq. 4)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.34 0.37* 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.83 0.49*** 0.10
(0.26) (0.19) (0.17) (0.41) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.16 0.13 0.29** 0.15 0.25 -0.12 -0.19 0.25*
(0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.30) (0.18) (0.20) (0.14)
New business group (eq. 4)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.51** 0.35** 0.24*** 0.25 0.42** 0.85 0.32** 0.12
(0.21) (0.17) (0.07) (0.23) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Firm sold to connected buyer -0.03 0.11 0.19 -0.04 -0.11 -0.20 0.40* 0.15
(0.24) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13)
Old business group (eq. 3)
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.03
(0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.31) (0.20) (0.18) (0.15)
Old business group (eq. 4)
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.17 0.02 -0.06 -0.00 -0.18 -0.02 0.17 -0.02
(0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.41) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.19 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.36** 0.14 -0.59*** 0.11
(0.25) (0.17) (0.13) (0.30) (0.17) (0.10) (0.16)
Firms 49 79 79 36 68 79 79 112
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from a different estimation strategy. “Eq. 3” refers to the econo-
metric specification in equation (3) and “Eq. 4” to the specification in (4). All privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms
in the control group operated during the same period of time but remained private throughout these years. Columns 1-3 offer three
different matching estimators. Column 4 includes an additional control for group affiliation in 1970 (subsample with available infor-
mation). Column 5 drops from the estimation the few firms with takeovers. Column 6 implements the coefficient stability method
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and extended by Oster (2019). Column 7 uses a different definition of “connected buyers.” Finally,
column 8 includes more firms in the control group by relaxing the data requirements. See section 6.3 for details. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Business group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized after the economic crisis 0.40* 0.39** 0.11 0.33 0.38** 0.64 0.45*** 0.25*
(0.22) (0.17) (0.10) (0.32) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.52* 0.58*** 0.14 0.49 0.59*** 1.41 0.56*** 0.17
(0.30) (0.19) (0.27) (0.56) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20)
New business group
Privatized after the economic crisis 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.24 0.36** 0.47 0.40*** 0.23*
(0.17) (0.14) (0.09) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.51* 0.21 0.05 -0.03 0.32 1.88 0.24 0.08
(0.30) (0.22) (0.05) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) (0.15)
Old business group
Privatized after the economic crisis -0.09 -0.09 -0.29 0.09 0.02 0.30 0.05 0.01
(0.20) (0.17) (0.12) (0.33) (0.20) (0.18) (0.15)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.01 0.36 0.09 0.52 0.28 0.87 0.32 0.09
(0.48) (0.30) (0.27) (0.57) (0.32) (0.28) (0.22)
Firms 49 79 79 36 68 79 79 112
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from a different estimation strategy. All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time but remained private throughout these
years. Columns 1-3 offer three different matching estimators. Column 4 includes an additional control for group affiliation in 1970
(subsample with available information). Column 5 drops from the estimation the few firms with takeovers. Column 6 implements
the coefficient stability method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and extended by Oster (2019). Column 7 uses a different definition
of “connected buyers.” Finally, column 8 includes more firms in the control group by relaxing the data requirements. See section 6.3
for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Business group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Privatized after the economic crisis 0.33 0.30 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.45 0.37* 0.17
(0.23) (0.19) (0.11) (0.37) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.08 0.49 0.60*** 1.36 0.61*** 0.31*
(0.17) (0.14) (0.21) (0.29) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
New business group
Privatized after the economic crisis 0.53** 0.51*** 0.42*** 0.23 0.38** 0.57 0.43*** 0.24*
(0.20) (0.16) (0.11) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.46** 0.30* 0.08 0.21 0.31* 1.84 0.28 0.13
(0.22) (0.18) (0.05) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14)
Old business group
Privatized after the economic crisis -0.19 -0.21 -0.38*** -0.09 -0.10 -0.00 -0.06 -0.07
(0.22) (0.19) (0.13) (0.34) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16)
Privatized before the economic crisis 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.30 0.80 0.34 0.18
(0.28) (0.21) (0.22) (0.32) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18)
Firms 49 79 79 36 68 79 79 112
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from a different estimation strategy. All privatizations occurred
in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during the same period of time but remained private throughout these
years. Columns 1-3 offer three different matching estimators. Column 4 includes an additional control for group affiliation in 1970
(subsample with available information). Column 5 drops from the estimation the few firms with takeovers. Column 6 implements
the coefficient stability method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and extended by Oster (2019). Column 7 uses a different definition
of “connected buyers.” Finally, column 8 includes more firms in the control group by relaxing the data requirements. See section 6.3
for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Pyramid (eq. 3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.18 0.21 0.24* 0.44 0.41** 0.27 0.29* 0.12
(0.23) (0.18) (0.13) (0.34) (0.19) (0.18) (0.13)
Wedge (eq. 3)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.24 0.30 0.20 0.16 -0.06
(0.23) (0.19) (0.13) (0.36) (0.20) (0.19) (0.14)
Provider (eq. 3)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.04 0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.09 0.41 0.09 0.07
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.21) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)
Receiver (eq. 3)
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 -0.10**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Receiver (eq. 4)
Firm privatized by Pinochet -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.09* -0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Firms 49 79 79 36 68 79 79 112
Industry fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Pre-privatization controls X X X X X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from a different estimation strategy. “Eq. 3” refers to the econo-
metric specification in equation (3) and “Eq. 4” to the specification in (4). All privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms
in the control group operated during the same period of time but remained private throughout these years. Columns 1-3 offer three
different matching estimators. Column 4 includes an additional control for group affiliation in 1970 (subsample with available infor-
mation). Column 5 drops from the estimation the few firms with takeovers. Column 6 implements the coefficient stability method
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and extended by Oster (2019). Column 7 uses a different definition of “connected buyers.” Finally,
column 8 includes more firms in the control group by relaxing the data requirements. See section 6.3 for details. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A.12: Flexible size control, business group
Business group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.04
(0.15) (0.13) (0.17)
Firms 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X
Flexible size control X X X
Other pre-privatization controls X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from equation (3). All
privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during
the same period of time but remained private throughout these years. The main difference with
the results in the paper is the inclusion a flexible control for firm size pre-privatization, i.e.
indicators for quartiles of the size distribution as measured by assets. See section 6.3 for details.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A.13: Flexible size control, economic crisis
Before/after 1984 Before/after 1985
New group Old group New group Old group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Privatized after the crisis 0.52*** -0.10 0.52*** -0.21
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19)
Privatized before the crisis 0.13 0.38 0.28 0.30
(0.25) (0.33) (0.17) (0.21)
Firms 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X
Flexible size control X X X X
Other pre-privatization controls X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from equation (3). All
privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during
the same period of time but remained private throughout these years. The main difference with
the results in the paper is the inclusion a flexible control for firm size pre-privatization, i.e.
indicators for quartiles of the size distribution as measured by assets. See section 6.3 for details.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
xvii
Table A.14: Flexible size control, role within groups
Pyramid Wedge Providers Receivers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm privatized by Pinochet 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04
(0.20) (0.20) (0.12) (0.07)
Firm sold to connected buyer 0.40*** 0.40** 0.19* -0.02
(0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.05)
Firms 79 79 79 79
Industry fixed effects X X X X
Flexible size control X X X X
Other pre-privatization controls X X X X
Notes: In this table each observation is a firm and estimates come from equation (3). All
privatizations occurred in the period 1973–1989. Firms in the control group operated during
the same period of time but remained private throughout these years. The main difference with
the results in the paper is the inclusion a flexible control for firm size pre-privatization, i.e.
indicators for quartiles of the size distribution as measured by assets. See section 6.3 for details.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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